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Abstract
We investigate the effect of information asymmetry on a dynamic Cournot
duopoly game with bounded rationality. Concretely, we study how one player’s
possession of information about the other player’s behavior in a duopoly affects
the stability of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. We theoretically and numeri-
cally show that the information stabilizes the Cournot-Nash equilibrium and
suppresses chaotic behavior in the duopoly.
Keywords: Discrete dynamical systems; Cournot duopoly games; Bounded
rationality; Information asymmetry; Complex dynamics
1. Introduction
An oligopoly is a market where a few firms control the price of a good.
Cournot first introduced the oligopoly model in 1838. He considered an econ-
omy of two firms (players) producing the same good, both firms choosing their
respective production to maximize their profit. Because the profit of each firm
depends on its production as well as the production of the other firm, the situ-
ation is game theoretic. Each firm needs to correctly anticipate the behavior of
the other firm. The equilibrium state between the two players is known as the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium; here, each player’s response to the other is optimal.
This equilibrium is realized when the two players are sufficiently rational.
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However, in reality, the players are not necessarily rational. Previous studies
have examined games in which the players have bounded rationality [1]. As
a toy model, the Cournot duopoly game model with bounded rationality has
recently attracted much attention. The discrete-time dynamics of a Cournot
duopoly game with bounded rationality has been analyzed in Refs. [2, 3]. In
this model, two players adjust their outputs step by step in order to increase their
respective profits. Here, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is not necessarily stable,
and even chaotic behavior can occur in some parameter regions, as in dynamic
Cournot duopoly games with naive response [4, 5]. Following these studies, the
model was extended to the case of nonlinear demand function [6, 7, 8]. Another
extension is the Cournot duopoly game with heterogeneous players, where the
two players adopt different decision-making strategies [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. In
addition, the dynamic Cournot duopoly game with time delay [15] as well as
the Cournot triopoly with bounded rationality [16, 17] has been studied. All
these studies report that the dynamics of an oligopoly with bounded rationality
is very complicated.
Another significant concept in modern microeconomics is information asym-
metry, where one player has more or better information than the others. This
asymmetry can create a power imbalance in transactions, which in turn could
lead to market failure in the worst case. Previous studies have considered the
effect of information asymmetry on games with rational players [18]. However,
the concept of information asymmetry in games where the players have bounded
rationality has not yet been well established. Therefore, we try to explain the
effect of information asymmetry on games with bounded rationality by taking
the Cournot duopoly game as an example.
Concretely, we investigate a discrete-time dynamic Cournot duopoly game
of players with bounded rationality where one player has information about the
behavior of the other player. The player with information adjusts his output
based on the present output of the other player. We then theoretically and
numerically show that the information stabilizes the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
and suppresses the chaotic behavior in larger parameters compared with the case
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where there is no information asymmetry. A similar situation was investigated
in the context of information acquisition by two information-sharing firms about
the third firm in a triopoly game [19].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a dynamic Cournot
duopoly game model of bounded rational players with information asymme-
try. Section 3 provides theoretical and numerical results that the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium is stabilized and chaotic behavior is suppressed by effect of infor-
mation asymmetry. Section 4 provides the concluding remarks of the paper.
Appendix A reviews the results for the dynamic Cournot duopoly game where
there is no information asymmetry; see Ref. [2].
2. Model
We consider two firms (players) i = 1, 2 producing the same good. The
production (output) of each firm is described by qi. We assume that the price
of the good is determined by the total supply Q = q1 + q2 through the linear
inverse demand function:
p(q1, q2) = a− bQ (1)
where a and b are positive constants. If the total supply is increased, the price
of the good becomes lower. We also assume that the cost of production of firm
i is linear, as cqi with c > 0. With these assumptions, the profit of firm i can
be given by
Πi(q1, q2) = (a− bQ) qi − cqi. (2)
In the right-hand side, the first term represents the sales of the good and the
second term represents the cost of the good. Thus, if these difference becomes
larger, the profit is increased. When both players are rational, their best re-
sponses are given by the profit maximization conditions
0 =
∂Π1
∂q1
(q1, q2) (3)
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and
0 =
∂Π2
∂q2
(q1, q2), (4)
to achieve the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
q1 = q2 =
a− c
3b
. (5)
We can easily find that those conditions give the maximum profit, respectively.
We consider the dynamics of two bounded rational players [2]. The produc-
tion of player i at time t ∈ {0, 1, · · ·} is described as qi(t). Each player adjusts
his production step by step in order to increase his profit. We consider the
situation in which player 1 adjusts his production as
q1(t+ 1) = q1(t) + αq1(t)
∂Π1
∂q1
(q1(t), q2(t)) . (6)
In the right-hand side, the first term means the production in the previous step,
and the second term means the effect that player 1 adjusts his production step
by step according to the gradient of his profit. The positive constant α is called
speed of adjustment. We consider the information asymmetric situation such
that player 2 already knows q1(t + 1) at time t + 1 in some way and chooses
q2(t+ 1) as
q2(t+ 1) = q2(t) + αq2(t)
∂Π2
∂q2
(q1(t+ 1), q2(t)) . (7)
Here, we assume that the two players’ speed of adjustment is common. There-
fore, the dynamics of the two players is described as
q1(t+ 1) = q1(t) + αq1(t) [a− c− 2bq1(t)− bq2(t)] (8)
q2(t+ 1) = q2(t) + αq2(t) [a− c− 2bq2(t)− bq1(t+ 1)]
= q2(t) + αq2(t) [a− c− 2bq2(t)− bq1(t)]
−α2bq1(t)q2(t) [a− c− 2bq1(t)− bq2(t)] . (9)
In Appendix A, we provide the results for the model where there is no infor-
mation asymmetry.
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3. Results
3.1. Equilibrium points and local stability
We first study the equilibrium points of the dynamic game. The fixed points
are given by equations
0 = q1 [a− c− 2bq1 − bq2] (10)
0 = q2 [a− c− 2bq2 − bq1] , (11)
which are obtained by considering q1(t) = q1(t+1) = q1 and q2(t) = q2(t+1) =
q2 in (8) and (9), respectively. Note that this condition is the same as the case
where there is no information asymmetry. We find that there are four fixed
points:
E0 = (0, 0) (12)
E1 =
(
a− c
2b
, 0
)
(13)
E2 =
(
0,
a− c
2b
)
(14)
E∗ =
(
a− c
3b
,
a− c
3b
)
, (15)
which are obtained by the condition that each factor in (10) and (11) becomes
zero. The fixed points E1 and E2 correspond to monopolistic fixed points. We
assume that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium E∗ exists; that is,
a− c > 0. (16)
The local stability of each fixed point is characterized by eigenvalues of the
Jacobian matrix
J (q1, q2) =

 J1,1 J1,2
J2,1 J2,2

 (17)
with
J1,1 = 1 + α(a− c− 4bq1 − bq2) (18)
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J1,2 = −αbq1 (19)
J2,1 = −αbq2 − α2b(a− c)q2 + 4α2b2q1q2 + α2b2q22 (20)
J2,2 = 1 + α(a− c− 4bq2 − bq1)− α2b(a− c)q1 + 2α2b2q21
+2α2b2q1q2. (21)
When the absolute value of the two eigenvalues is smaller than 1, displacement
from the fixed point decays to zero, that is, the fixed point is locally stable.
First, we find that
J (0, 0) =

 1 +A 0
0 1 +A

 (22)
with A ≡ α(a − c), and then we find that E0 is unstable under the condition
(16).
Next, we consider the stability of E1 and E2. The Jacobian matrix at E1 is
J
(
a− c
2b
, 0
)
=

 1−A − 12A
0 1 + 1
2
A

 . (23)
Therefore, E1 is a saddle point for 0 < A < 2 and unstable for A > 2. The
Jacobian matrix at E2 is
J
(
0,
a− c
2b
)
=

 1 + 12A 0
− 1
2
A− 1
4
A2 1−A

 . (24)
We observe that E2 is also a saddle point for 0 < A < 2 and unstable for A > 2.
Finally, we investigate the stability of the Cournot-Nash fixed point E∗. The
Jacobian matrix at E∗ is
J
(
a− c
3b
,
a− c
3b
)
=

 1− 23A − 13A
− 1
3
A+ 2
9
A2 1− 2
3
A+ 1
9
A2

 . (25)
The eigenvalues of this matrix are given by
λ =
1
18
[
18− 12A+A2 ±A
√
36− 24A+A2
]
. (26)
Both eigenvalues are non-negative and λ < 1 for 0 < A < 12 − 6√3. For
A > 12− 6√3, λ is complex and
|λ|2 =
(
1− 2
3
A
)2
. (27)
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Therefore, E∗ is locally stable for A < 3. According to Appendix A, the sta-
bility condition of E∗ in the original Cournot game is A < 2. Therefore, we can
say that the information asymmetry broadens the stabilized region of E∗.
3.2. Bifurcation diagram
In order to investigate properties of trajectories realized by our model, we
numerically solve equations (8) and (9). We set the parameters as a = 2,
b = 1, and c = 1. In these parameters, we have E∗ = (1/3, 1/3) and A = α.
Fig. 1 plots the bifurcation diagram of q1 with initial condition (q1(0), q2(0)) =
(0.1, 0.1), and (q1(0), q2(0)) = (0.33, 0.33). Points q1(t) with t ∈ [1001, 1100]
are plotted for each α. We observe that a periodic orbit with period three
discontinuously appears at α ≃ 2.75 for the former case, although the local
stability condition α < 3 of the Cournot-Nash fixed point E∗ is satisfied in
this region. That is, although the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is locally stable in
α < 3, it is not necessarily globally stable. Such discontinuous appearance of a
periodic trajectory does not occur for an information symmetric case, as seen
in Appendix A. We can also see aperiodic behavior for larger α. Note that the
trajectories become unbounded for α > 3.11.
We can understand the appearance of a periodic orbit as follows. If equations
(8) and (9) have the non-trivial solution (q1(t), q2(t)) = (r2, r1), (q1(t+ 1), q2(t+ 1)) =
(r3, r2), and (q1(t+ 2), q2(t+ 2)) = (r1, r3) with
r1 = r3 + αr3 [a− c− 2br3 − br2] (28)
r2 = r1 + αr1 [a− c− 2br1 − br3] (29)
r3 = r2 + αr2 [a− c− 2br2 − br1] , (30)
a periodic orbit exists. When we define Rn ≡ αbrn with n = 1, 2, 3, these Rn
satisfy
R1 = R3 +R3 [A− 2R3 −R2] (31)
R2 = R1 +R1 [A− 2R1 −R3] (32)
R3 = R2 +R2 [A− 2R2 −R1] . (33)
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Figure 1: Bifurcation diagram for q1 with a = 2, b = 1, and c = 1, and initial condition
(q1(0), q2(0)) = (0.1, 0.1) (top) and (q1(0), q2(0)) = (0.33, 0.33) (bottom). It should be noted
that the Cournot-Nash fixed point (15) is (1/3, 1/3).
These equations have a non-trivial solution for A that is larger than A ≃ 2.75.
This explains the existence of a periodic solution.
We next discuss the basin of attraction of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
point E∗. In Fig. 2, we display the basin of attraction of E∗ at α = 2.8 and
α = 2.9, which is the set of initial conditions (q1(0), q2(0)) which converge to the
Cournot-Nash fixed point E∗ after 2000 iterations. We observe that the basin of
attraction of E∗ becomes smaller and smaller as α increases. It should be noted
that the basin of attraction disappears at α = 3.0. Therefore, the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium point is not globally stable after the periodic orbit appears.
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Figure 2: The basin of attraction of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium point E∗ at α = 2.8 (top)
and α = 2.9 (bottom).
3.3. Maximal Lyapunov exponent
The Lyapunov exponent is a quantity in dynamical systems theory that char-
acterizes the rate of separation of infinitesimally close trajectories. When the
Lyapunov exponent is positive, it implies that behavior of the dynamical sys-
tem is chaotic. In contrast, when it is negative, the separation of infinitesimally
close trajectories converges to zero. Generally, the Lyapunov exponent depends
on the direction of the initial separation vector. Therefore, the number of the
Lyapunov exponents is equal to the dimension of the phase space. Because
the existence of chaotic behavior is characterized by the maximal Lyapunov
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Figure 3: Maximal Lyapunov exponent for a = 2, b = 1, and c = 1, and initial condition
(q1(0), q2(0)) = (0.1, 0.1) and (q1(0), q2(0)) = (0.33, 0.33). The straight line represents zero.
exponent, which is the largest Lyapunov exponent, we focus on the maximal
Lyapunov exponent.
We numerically calculate the maximal Lyapunov exponent by using the
method proposed in Ref. [20]. Fig. 3 displays the maximal Lyapunov exponent
for a = 2, b = 1, and c = 1, and the initial condition (q1(0), q2(0)) = (0.1, 0.1)
and (q1(0), q2(0)) = (0.33, 0.33). We observe that the maximal Lyapunov expo-
nent is positive for α > 3.02, implying a chaotic behavior for α > 3.02. We also
find that the bifurcation from a periodic orbit with period three at α ∼ 2.90 does
not seem to contribute to chaotic behavior. Fig. 4 displays a chaotic attractor
at α = 3.10.
4. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we investigated the effect of information asymmetry on the
discrete-time dynamic Cournot duopoly game with bounded rationality. Con-
cretely, we studied how one player’s information about the other player’s behav-
ior in a duopoly affects the stability of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. We the-
oretically and numerically showed that the information stabilizes the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium and suppresses the chaotic behavior. Note that a periodic
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Figure 4: A chaotic attractor at α = 3.10.
orbit does not discontinuously appear in case there is no information asymme-
try. Our result suggests that information acquisition about the strategy of the
other firm in oligopoly market is useful to stabilize the equilibrium point. This
property may hold in realistic market. The case that speeds of adjustment of
two players are not common will be studied in future.
The interpretation of our results from the perspective of numerical simulation
suggests that the non-synchronous update of qi can avoid chaotic behavior in this
model. A future study should examine whether a similar behavior is observed
for different games with bounded rationality, which also report chaotic behavior
[21, 22].
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Appendix A.
In this appendix, we review the results for the case where player 2 does not
have information about the current behavior of player 1; see Ref. [2]. The
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dynamics of the two players in this case is described by the map
q1(t+ 1) = q1(t) + αq1(t) [a− c− 2bq1(t)− bq2(t)] (A.1)
q2(t+ 1) = q2(t) + αq2(t) [a− c− 2bq2(t)− bq1(t)] . (A.2)
That is, two players are symmetric and bounded rational. The fixed points are
given by the equations
0 = q1 [a− c− 2bq1 − bq2] (A.3)
0 = q2 [a− c− 2bq2 − bq1] . (A.4)
Here, we find four fixed points:
E0 = (0, 0) (A.5)
E1 =
(
a− c
2b
, 0
)
(A.6)
E2 =
(
0,
a− c
2b
)
(A.7)
E∗ =
(
a− c
3b
,
a− c
3b
)
. (A.8)
We assume the Cournot-Nash equilibrium E∗ exists; that is,
a− c > 0. (A.9)
The stability of each fixed point is characterized by eigenvalues of the Jaco-
bian matrix
J (q1, q2) =

 J1,1 J1,2
J2,1 J2,2

 (A.10)
with
J1,1 = 1 + α(a− c− 4bq1 − bq2) (A.11)
J1,2 = −αbq1 (A.12)
J2,1 = −αbq2 (A.13)
J2,2 = 1 + α(a− c− 4bq2 − bq1). (A.14)
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First, we find that
J (0, 0) =

 1 +A 0
0 1 +A

 (A.15)
with A ≡ α(a − c), and then we find that E0 is unstable under the condition
(A.9).
Next, we consider the stability of E1. The Jacobian matrix at E1 is
J
(
a− c
2b
, 0
)
=

 1−A − 12A
0 1 + 1
2
A

 . (A.16)
Therefore, E1 is the saddle point for 0 < A < 2 and unstable for A > 2. Because
the two players are symmetric, this result also holds for E2.
Finally, we investigate the stability of the Cournot-Nash fixed point E∗. The
Jacobian matrix at E∗ is
J
(
a− c
3b
,
a− c
3b
)
=

 1− 23A − 13A
− 1
3
A 1− 2
3
A

 . (A.17)
The eigenvalues of this matrix are
λ = 1−A, 1− 1
3
A. (A.18)
Therefore, the local stability condition of E∗ is A < 2.
We present the bifurcation diagram in Fig. A.5. The parameters are set to
a = 2, b = 1, and c = 1. The initial condition is set to (q1(0), q2(0)) = (0.1, 0.2),
and 100 points are plotted after 1000 iterations. We find period-doubling bi-
furcation occurring at α = 2. Note that the trajectories become unbounded for
α > 2.84. We also display the α dependence of maximal Lyapunov exponent in
Fig. A.6. We observe that the maximal Lyapunov exponent is positive for α
larger than α∗ ≃ 2.57, indicating chaotic behavior.
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